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Takeovers: Good or Evil?
In recent years, the pace ofcorporate takeovers
has accelerated, surpassing even the feverish pace
achieved in the "go-go" conglomerate merger days
ofthelate 1960s. According to securities industry
sources, 1985 may see the completion of over
2500 corporate combinations. Besides affecting
the structure ofthe industries involved, takeover
activity has had an important impact on debt
markets since many takeovers are financed with
borrowed funds.
For these reasons, many analysts are interested in
the takeover phenomenon. Both Congress and
regulatory agencies are increasingly concerned
about the effects oftakeovers on the corporate
sector and the stability ofthe financial system.
The purpose of this Weekly Letter is to examine
briefly the rationale and implications ofcorporate
takeovers. It appears that takeovers very likely per-
form a useful function in bringing new information
to bear on the value of stocks and in imposing dis-
cipline on corporate management. But takeovers
also generate risks for the lenders to such activities.
What is atakeover?
The terminology employed in discussions ofcor-
porate combinations is an unfortunate blend of
formal economic, financial and journalistic ter-
minology. In general, friendly takeovers might
more properly be called mergers because the man-
agements ofthe companies involved negotiate
cooperatively to join their respective enterprises. A
hostile or unfriendlytakeover usually begins with a
tender offer for the shares ofa target firm by
another corporation hostile oralien to the manage-
ment of the target firm. The presumed goal in such
hostile takeovers is to acquire sufficient control
over voting shares to wrest management authority
away from the target firm's current management.
In a self-tender, extant management buys back
outstanding shares from public shareholders; in the
extreme, all shares are acquired and the firm "goes
private." (In going private, tenders may be financed
with borrowed funds secured by the firm's assets,
in which case the term leveraged buyoutalso is
used to describe the transaction.) In a proxy fight,
groups ofshareholders vie with management for
changes in corporate policy by forming voting
blocks orcoalitions.
What all of these transactions have in common is
that the extant management and/or its relationship
to shareholders is changed. A merger orhostile
takeover within an industry also changes the struc-
ture of that industry byjoining formerly separate
enterprises.
Takeovers and stock prices
To study the causes of takeovers, it is useful to
review the events that take place in the course ofa
takeover, with a particular focus on the prices of
the shares of the candidate and acquiring firms.
Since share prices should reflect current and future
anticipated returns to shareholders, they are a con-
venient barometer of the market's assessment of
the takeover process.
A takeover may begin with a "silent" acquisition of
shares by the acquiring firm or individual. If more
than 5 percentofthe outstanding shares of the
target firm are acquired, the buyer must file Form
13D with the SEC, thereby revealing the acquirer's
intended strategy. A similar but more formal pro-
cess is engaged ifthe acquiring firm wishes to issue
a tender offer for acontrolling interest in the firm.
Form 14D mustbe filed, stating the offer price and
other particulars of the tender.
Studies have shown that the stock price ofthe
target firm can rise 25 to 30 percentafter these
announcements. However, a recent study at the
University of Rochester also indicates that the
stock price begins to rise even during the "silent"
phase of an acquisition, suggesting that brokers
and others in the marketplace use information on
the volume of shares traded as an indication of
nascent takeover activity. Also, the stock prices of
other firms in the candidate firm's industry tend to
rise sympathetically with increases in the target
firm's stock price. In contrast, the stock price ofthe
bidding oracquiring firm rises very little ifatall dur-
ing orafter the merger or takeover process. This
suggests that whatevergains were anticipated as a
result of the combination are captured largely by
shareholders of the target firm.
If the takeover is a hostile one, the management of
the candidate firm may defend itself in several
ways. In the case ofa formal merger tender, it mayFRBSF
urge its shareholders to reject the offer and seek
another (higher) bidder oraccept the candidate
firm's own counteroffer. In some cases, the candi-
date firm may borrow money to make a self-tender
or make an exchange of shares for debt. The
shareholders usually benefit in the case ofa self-
tender. The management also may react by buying
back theshares bought by the acquiring firm ata
premium in return foran agreementtostop the
takeover attempt. Such transactions between
management and the suitor are referred to collo-
quially as "greenmail."
Dann and DeAngelo find that the stock price of the
candidate firm typically falls when greenmail is
paid, reflecting the fact that the "greenmailer" has
been partially successful in capturing the wealth of
the corporation. In contrast, ifthe takeover fails
because the parties are unable to come toterms or
if the merger is disallowed by antitrust authorities,
the share price remains above its preacquisition
level. After more than two failed takeover
attempts, however, the candidate firm's share price
appears to revert to previous levels.
Why do firms merge1
Economists have used information on share price
movementsduring the course ofa takeover to
understand the motives ~ and thereforethe
desirability from a social pointofview ~ of
takeover activity. One view ofthe dynamics is that
stock prices respondbecause market participants
interpret a takeover attempt as evidence of the
existence ofsuperior information about the
prospects ofthe target firm or its industry. This
hypothesis is consistent with the stock price
increases observed during both the "silent" and
formal takeover periods. Sympathetic price move-
mentsin the stocks of other firms in the same
industry suggest that the market believed the new
information was pertinent to the general prospects
ofthe industry and not the management orstruc-
ture ofthe candidate firm alone. According to this
information hypothesis, the takeover need not
actually occur to cause a permanent elevation in
the share price of firms in the target industry. And,
indeed, share price elevation usually does persist
fora period oftime even if a takeoverattemptfails.
An alternative descriptibn ofevents underlying
takeovers involves the notion of synergy. Accord-
ing to this hypothesis, firms seek to combine in
order to exploit complementary productive or
financial attributes. Their combined operations
presumably would be more economical than that
enjoyed by the entities separately. Such synergistic
opportunities, of course, can only be enjoyed if the
takeover actually occurs.
Bradley, Desai and Kim suggest that the behavior of
target firm share prices is more consistent with the
synergy hypothesis than the information
hypothesis. In particular, they find that although
the share prices of the candidate firm remain ele-
vated when initial takeover bids are unsuccessful,
the share prices ofcandidate firms remain elevated
when initial takeover bids are unsuccessful, the
share prices do drift back to pre-tender offer levels
unless the takeover occurs. This does not explain,
however, why the share prices of target firms rise
even before the identity of the bidder is known
(Le., in the case of"silent acquisitions"), or when
there is no outside bidder, as in the case of self-
tenders. Moreover, it is possible that the lack of
true permanence in the elevation of target firm
share prices after a series of unsuccessful bids
simply may reflect the market's re-evaluation of
the quality of the original information.
A final, and less benign, interpretation of share
price behavior is that takeovers represent events
that increase monopoly power in an industry.
Indeed, an increase in market power would be
expected to result in an elevation of product
prices, profits and, thereby, share prices. Some
sympathetic increases in the share prices ofcom-
petitorfirms also might be expected since the
prices received by all firms in the same industry
might be elevated. Such an argument might have
greater force if all mergers involved firms in the
same industry, since that would enhance the con-
centration of market share (atleast briefly, by
perhaps facilitating anticompetitive, covert coor-
dination of pricing behavior). However, the same
pattern of share price elevation is observed in con-
glomerate takeovers when.the bidder is from out-
side the industry.
In addition, the market power hypothesis fails to
explain the appreciation in price experienced dur-
ing self-tenders, which have no consequences for
market structure. In leveraged buyouts, current
shareholders receive premia (of as much as 50 per-
cent) over prevailing market value to surrender
control to current management. The fact that cur-
rent shareholders are bought outata premiumsuggests that management's motivation has been
increased by greater management participation in
ownership and closer surveillance by other profes-
sional owners. (Tax advantages sometimes also
flow from restructuring ownership.)
.Management resistance
Management resistance also is a prominent feature
of the natural history of most takeovers. Critics of
management resistance argue that resistance is to
be expected since the modern corporation is run
not simply to maximize shareholder wealth (as
assumed by economic theory) but also to indulge
oth~rpreferencesofthe managers, As a result of
such so-called "expense-preference" behavior,
management (and perhaps employees ofthe firm
generally) is reluctant to put its perquisites and
powerat risk even ifthe trade-off is some sacrifice
of shareholder wealth.
Economist Harry Manne argues that competition
between managements via takeovers has replaced
shareholder vigilance in disciplining the manage-
ment of firms. According to this argument,
takeovers afford opportunities to replace compla-
cent management and is one of the sources,
therefore, ofthe observed appreciation in the
value of the target firm's shares. Indeed, jensen and
Ruback report that share prices rise after a proxy
fight even if the fight is unsuccessful; they suggest
thatjust "putting management's feet to the fire" is
productive.
Despite this view's appeal, it does have some logi-
cal shortcomings. As we have observed, prices of
other firms in the target industry rise sym-
pathetically after a tender offer. It seems unlikely
that everyfirm's management suffers from compla-
cency unless the structure or some other charac-
teristics of the industry predispose it to expense-
preference behavior. But if the industry were so
predisposed, how could the market be certain that
new management would behave differently?
Regardless of its motives, however, a recent study
by Gregg jarrell suggests that management's resis-
tance to takeovers has the effect of stimulating
other bidders and creating acompetitive "auction"
for the candidate firm. Thus, the wealth ofa target
firm's shareholders actually may be increased by
resistance despite the costs of litigation, "green-
mail" payments and other devices to thwart
acquisition. jarrell found that in fully 80 percent of
the cases he studied, initial resistance resulted in
more remunerative subsequent bids.
Too hard ortooeasy?
The fact that target firms' shareholders appear to
capture most of the gains from takeovers and
takeover attempts, despite or because of manage-
ment resistance, may not be acause for rejoicing.
Since the bidders are, by definition, those who
possess new information or notions about syn-
ergistic opportunities, their failure to capture the
economic value of the gains may retard their
attempts to do so.
Indeed, it could be argued that the requirement to
register significant share acquisitions and tender.
offers with regulatory authorities may lead to
lnefficiency in the functioning of the stock market
or the firms themselves. Moreover, if existing
shareholders can be confident that they will cap-
ture most of the gains from new information about
the assets or operations of firms through takeover
attempts, they lose some of the incentive to
scrutinize the behavior of current management.
Viewed from this perspective, the problem with
takeover activity may be that it is too difficult to
accomplish for it to be a viable threat to compla-
cent management.
In addition, the fact that most of the benefits of a
takeover are captured by existing shareholders
means that the holders of the debtand equity of
the acquiring firm cannot expect to enjoy abnor-
mally high (risk-adjusted) returns. Put differently,
the high yields embodied in the loans and "junk"
bonds used to finance takeovers are accompanied
by high risk.
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 197,956 - 977 9,800 5.2
Loans and Leases1 6 179,831 - 529 10,114 5.9
Commercial and Industrial 51,566 - 292 - 1,601 - 3.0
Real estate 65,908 149 4,291 6.9
Loans to Individuals 38,178 127 6,756 21.5
Leases 5,412 - 14 333 6.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,725 - 506 - 810 - 7.0
Other Securities2 7,400 59 497 7.1
Total Deposits 202,983 - 792 10,569 5.4
Demand Deposits 50,748 - 692 5,790 12.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 34,324 557 5,436 18.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,684 - 305 2,012 15.8
Total No'n-Transaction Balances6 137,551 205 2,765 2.0
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 45,903 29 5,189 12.7
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 ormore 38,122 162 - 2,527 - 6.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,620 - 4,178 1,957 09.0
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position,All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change
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